This chapter is limited to O-rings. They are the most frequent sealing element. This is not least
based on its simplicity in design and assembly. Anyway, they are not unproblematic. This shows
already emerged incidents up to flight accidents, which stay in causative connection with the failure of an
O ring seal.
O-rings are liked to use there, where the seal must be frequently loosened/disassembled and
again fixed/assembled. However this increases the likelihood of a problem. Typical example are sealings
of magnetic plugs in the oil system (Fig. "Nightshift problems", Fig. "Simultaneous maintenance work" and Fig. "Maintenance error leading to engine failure").
The seemingly simple installation of the O-rings and the positioning between the faces to be
sealed can prove difficult. It demands application specific
experience, expertise and skill. For
example experience is demanded during the pushing together or screwing of the components to be sealed.
Thereby is must be payed attention at features like mating forces and
clearances. These can indicate a damage of the O ring (Fig. "Assembly of O-ring seals" and Fig. "Aged O-rings"). Expert knowledge is already demanded when the
O-ring must be pretreated for postioning (e.g., greasing as specified). It is especially demanded, if the
ring is slided elastically prestressed without damage
over edges (e.g., of grooves or thread tip, Ill.
23.4.1-3).
Also in service O-rings can be damaged (Fig. "O-ring failures and its causes"). Because this seal element consists of
an elastomer, a compatibility with the medium to be
sealed is essential (Fig. "Influences of O-ring materials" and Ill.
23.4.1-13). If this medium is changed (e.g., change of the lubrication oil type or the fuel) compatibility
must be guaranteed. If necessary, attention must be payed at measures, demanded by the OEM.
Additionally temperature and load depending aging effects
(embrittlement, plastic deformations, Ill.
23.4.1-4) must not deteriorate inacceptable the sealing effect through the scheduled operation interval. A
specified exchange of the O-ring must take place in the specified period of time. Especially after
long stand still periods, like a storage respectively
`mothballing' of the aeroengine or airplane, the condition
of the O rings must be checked. Also attention must be payed at the acceptance of a reuse.
In case of doubt usually applies the exchange to
„new“.
Concluding, it schould be pointed out that O rings almost `offer'
as SUPs (not approved). Therefore also at
features like colour, elasticity, production (burrs, joints) must be
payed attention before the installation (chapter 20.2.1).
Fig. "Failure potential of O-rings": The mounting and dismounting of components with an O-ring seal (e.g., magnetic plugs) as well as the exchange of an O-ring is a definitely demanding procedure. Typical causes for maintenance required problems are
To these problems belongs also the reassembly of
O-rings, which rather should be exchanged
against new parts. With this, the scheduled life time could be markedly exceeded and so aging
deteriorations can get effective.
Missed exchange, e.g., after an `mothballing' of the aeroengine/aircraft (Fig. "Failing mechanisms of O-rings"). This can
also apply for the long time storage of a component with O-rings (e.g., gear, control unit) at
unfavourable conditions (e.g., too high temperature).
O-ring problems can from experience act dangerously. During leakage of a medium like lubrication
oil or hydraulic fluid, important components (e.g., bearings, control units) and the aeroengine can
fail. This danger increases, if during the same maitenance procedure, at
several aeroengines of the aircraft the problem arose (Fig. "Maintenance error leading to engine failure").
Escaping leakage fluid can ignite and endanger the aircraft. Aggressive media or
decomposition products at hot parts (e.g., hydraulic fluid) can trigger dangerous
corrosion failures (Fig. "Contaminated Hydraulic fluid").
Also unnoticed scheared parts of an O-ring
can block/clogg narrow, close tolerated (e.g., in a
control unit) crosssections or oil nozzles.
Fig. "Assembly of O-ring seals" (Lit. 23.4.1-5 up to Lit. 23.4.1-10 and Lit. 23.4.1.16): To the layman, the
assembly of an O-ring seems simple and unproblematic. This is a mistake. As well the
mounting of the O-ring before the joining
into a groove, respectively on the seat demands attention and skill. Must the ring
slipped over edges of the groove, steps or threads (Fig. "O-ring damages by assembly"), it can be damaged by a cutting process. This
is promoted by the usual elastic expansion and correspondent high cutting
forces.
An especial critical assembly phase is the pushing together of the sealing
faces.
If the O-ring sits already in the key
seat („A”), it can be observed in the delicate moment of
the pushing together.
Sits the O-ring in a groove of the bore
(„B“), it can not be observed. Unsuitable
handling and/or a too sharp edge can
shear the ring unnoticed. To indicate this,
experience and sense are needed.
Shifted O-rings („D”) can no more fulfill their sealing function. Thereby the O-ring can be
shifted out of the groove as a whole or partly. (Fig. "Failing mechanisms of O-rings"). It can even during the assembly shift as far, that
its missing will not be noticed (Fig. "Technicians unfamiliar with aircraft").
As an earnest problem, hardly to experience, the
forgetting of O-rings has proved
(„E“, Bild 19.2-2.2). Such a situation seems more likely for a sealing with two O-rings (Fig. "Maintenance error leading to engine failure"). Not seldom a
lacking consideration of the `human factors'(Fig. "Maintenance error leading to engine failure") is also concurrently causative.
Fig. "O-ring damages by assembly" (Lit. 23.4.1-6): Already the preparation of the
sealing surfaces of the O-ring like groove
or the opposite face (sleeve), is of importance for a continuing safe sealing effect. They must be clean
and must not have rough or sharp edged
damages like wear spots, scores, notches or burrs.
Before the insertion, all contact surfaces
of the O-ring must be suitable lubricated. This is
especially important, when not sufficient guaranteed by the medium to be sealed (e.g., aeroengine oil). For
example this applies for the whole length of a driving rod. The
lubricant must be suitable for the service
conditions. It also must not inacceptable influence the medium to be sealed. Therefore, only
lubricants corresponding the specifications must be used. In case of doubt the OEM must be consulted.
For movable gas seals (pneumatic) often barium saponified grease/lubricant is used.
During the insertion, the ring shoud not be twisted and not pulled over sharp edges
(sketch above left). Dangerous are spline toothings, slots, connection openings and threads. To
prevent a damage, dangerous edges can be covered with
a plastic cap or a plastic tape (sketch above right).
During sliding on, the expansion should not be too large. Till the pushing together, the O-ring
must have enough time to contract again.
This is due to the fact, that elastomeres do not resile like metal.
In the groove, the O-ring should not more expanded than 5% of its inner diameter.
During sliding into the `sleeve' rotary motions and back and forth motions are not
recommended. With it, the risk of a deterioration rather increases.
Fig. "O-ring failures and its causes" (Lit. 23.4.1-2, Lit. 23.4.1-3 and Lit. 23.4.1-15): To prevent failures at O rings at
the beginning or with remedies, it is necessary
to identify failure causes and failure
mechanisms. Requirement is the evaluation of the failure
mode. Specific problems shall discussed in the
following more in detail:
Chemical decomposition is primarily determined from the
service temperature. It should lay below
the longtime temperature for elastomers, mostly between 135 and 150°C (Fig. "Aged O-rings"). Thereby it
must be suggested, that concerned is an endurance
temperature and not a short time maximum
temperature (see section „thermal
deterioration”). During too high temperature, a change of the molecular
strukture (aging) will occur. The thermal stability of an elastomer is also for the same type markedly
depending from the individual quality. Thereby contaminations and the interlacing of the molecules play an
important role. For example a decomposition can be triggered also with
trace metals. This means, that the quality assurance must finally rely on
the producer and the supplier/source. This can be important undre
the view of SUPs (chapter 20.2.1).
Typical consequences of an aging are:
Thermal deterioration is understood as caused by
overheating. It develops, when the
temperature, during which the elastomer
decomposites short-term was exceeded. Such a situation exists when
after the shut down of the aeroengine, the cooling by oil and air lacks. This leads to heavy heating by
the neighboured hot parts („heat soaking”, Fig. "Eelastomer seal overheating").
Compression deformation is a plastisc
(enduring) deformation of the O ring under the
compressive contact forces. In connection with
temperature changes and the so arising volume change
of the ring, a leak can develop (Fig. "Failing mechanisms of O-rings"). Especially
fluorine elastomers (fluororubber) tend to creep
deformation at the typical high service temperature.
Explosive pressure drop: Into the O ring elastomer
diffused medium, especially gas, gathers at
flaws below the surface, like micro pores. During a sudden pressure drop, the gas epands or it comes
to vapour formation. The result are deteriorations like
blisters, cracks and holes.
Extrusion traces back to an overload of the O ring by the
pressure deviation in the sealing gap (Ill.23.4.1-7).
Assembly damages: These occur in different types. Most frequently are
cuts and sheared areas, which develop during
carelessness during pushing together of the seal faces (Fig. "Assembly of O-ring seals" and Fig. "O-ring damages by assembly").
To these count so called „spiral
damages“. They stay in connection with a
twisting of the O ring. It occurs during pushing together with a rotative moverment.
Outgassing and/or dissolving from
components, shows as shrinking because of
the volume loss. During high temperatures it can come to a
chemical decomposition process. It makes components
of the seal material liquid or gaseous. Especially thermoplastic urethans are susceptible for such
a deterioration.
Gets water vapour or overheated water into the pores which form during outgassing, a
sponge like structure develops. Is the O-ring
not sufficiently supported, a fast seal failure must be expected.
Fig. "Inner crack formation at O-rings" ( Lit. 23.4.1-12): The development of
blisters in innner cracks, is traced back at
a diffusion of the medium to be sealed. This diffusion proceeds to
flaws like tiny pores. These (about 3 Vol %) must be expected in elastomers. The there
accumulated medium leads to pressure rise and
to tensile stresses vertical to the surface (not net modal flow). Then the crack development takes
place parallel to the surface. A widening of the cracks forms a
blister at the surface.
Susceptible for blistering are especially soft
duromers (low shear modulus respectively low
hardness). The propensity to blistering can be markedly reduced in a tight temperature range with a
filler.
Fig. "Eelastomer seal overheating" Fig. "Eelastomer seal overheating" (Lit. 23.4.1-5): During shut down of an aeroengine, also the oil flow and the cooling air come to an stand still. With this, the heat from the hot parts can advance to the seals (heat soaking). Are the temperaturees too high for the used seal elastomer, it comes to a permanent deformation and/or deteriorations like embrittlement and crack formation (Fig. "O-ring failures and its causes"). At pumps for shaft seals, usually a minimum leakage of about 1 drop per minute (correlates 3 ml/h) is tolerated. Also this will be prevented if possible, because painting/lacquerung and coatings can be damaged (especially annoying because visible from the outside!). However thereby it should be considered, that an aging of the O ring leads fast to an unacceptable leakage of several drops per minute.
Fig. "Failing mechanisms of O-rings" (Lit. 23.4.1-18): O-rings are from a further mechanism
mechanical loaded, besides the load, due to the
pressure difference in the medium.
Usually an O-ring is embetted in a circumferential
groove. It is elastically compressed by the
sealing face and contacts this as well as at the groove face
(„A”).
Does it come during service to a heating, the elastomer expands
markedly more (about a magnitude) than the metallic components. This volume expansion leads to a rise of the
compression of the ring („B1“). Under this compression the ring forms plastically (creep).
Does now the region of the seal cool down, for example duriing shut down of the engine,
the ring volume shrinks correspondingly. Is the plastic deformation so large, that the
elastic spring back of the ring material is no more sufficient to shut the
gap, a leak will occur („C1”).
This process can also lead to a further failure
mode, shear. In this case the seal material is
extruded through the sealing gap into the groove edge at the low pressure side
(„B2“). This is promoted from an aging caused loss of strength. Thereby the ring can at least
locally sheared off and a leak form
(„C2”).
Fig. "X-raying for an O-ring failure" (Lit. 23.4.1-14): Failure relevant O-rings usually are positioned
inside badly or not visible cavities. During the disassembly, the
danger of a damage or a change of failure explaining
position features exist (Fig. "Influencing the O-ring sealing effect"). This suggests wrong conclusions. Therefore it is of high importance,
to identify and document the unchanged position of the O-ring in the as assembled
condition. Against expectation, the practice showed, that this is possible
with X-ray, at least in casings from light
metals. The O ring material (possibly depending from the filler) weakens the suitable adjusted X-ray
sufficient, to produce enough contrast in the pictures.
Note: Not before the X-ray documentation the disassembly of this component should begin.
Fig. "Influencing the O-ring sealing effect"
Fig. "Influencing the O-ring sealing effect" (Lit. 23.4.1-14): During former flights, the crew noted fuel/oil smoke in the cockpit
during flight. This lead about 1 week before the flight accident to the exchange of the
Hydromechanical Metering Unit (= HMU) at the side of the
aeroengine. The work was carried out from the
operator. The dismouting took place as specified by a mechanic. The work was controlled and signed by
an inspector. After this, an other mechanic mounted the change component. To this work belonged
the installing of the cable to the bypass switch at the cover.
To the HMU belongs the fuel filter. Also
this was signed by an inspector. After this followed a
test run of the aeroengine with a fuel leak
clontrol. Two inspectors monitored the run and signed it. A mechanic cleared the aeroengine for flight.
Obviously, at this time no noticeable fuel leak has occurred.
The HMU of the suspect right accident aeroengine was dismounted for a test run. Already at
below 10% of the operation rotation speed of the fuel pump an extreme leakage occurred at the casing of
the fuel filter. After this the test was cancelled.
Already during the first inspection of the aeroengine on the wreckage, an
almost 0,3 mm wide gap between the filter cover and the contact face of the casing was
noticed (sketch left). After about one day, fuel leaked further out of the gap.
Before the removing of the filter cover, the
filter was X-rayed. This was carried out although it was
not certain if the O ring material weakens sufficiently the X-rays in the metallic casing for an
analysis. However the O ring was perfectly visible in its position. It could be seen, that the O-ring was
partly pressed out of the groove to the cover (sketch below right). This enabled the exit of the fuel at
the aeration bores and the drainage bores as well as the gap at the cover. It can be supposed that the
usual pressure fluctuations in the high pressure fuel system loosened the unsecured filter cover and
caused the dislocation of the O-ring. At the opinion of the investigator the cover was already not mounted
as specified at the producer supplied component before the assembly.
After X-ray the filter cover was unscrewed. Now the O ring was again in the designated groove
(!). Obviously the O-ring had displaced
back. Merely in the before displaced region,
small traces of abrasion and a little cut could be seen. This shows the
high valuue of the X-ray indication without
which inportant findings would have lacked.
The cover of the brushes from the starter generators of both aeroengines have not been fixed as
specified in the manual. These are belts which are laid around the generator. The corresponding
instructions could neither found in the work handouts of the operator, nor in the maintenance instructions of
the airplane manufacturer. The gaps at the fasteners have been unfortunately so distorted, that they
have been positioned over the casing openings to the brushes. So during a fuel leak, here an ignition
could occurred.
Conclusion of the investigating
authority (analogous): Cause for the flight accident was probably
at the OEM the faulty installation of the cover from the fuel
filter. Thereby it came to a gap between cover and supporting
face. The operator personnel did not notice this obvious failure. So the large
fuel leak was possible. The fuel could ignite at the
incorrect bare generator brushes. The consequence
was an explosion inside the aeroengine
nacelle. This brought the fire extinguish device out of function.
So the fire was possible.
Note: After long storage periods in the as assembled condition, O rings must be checked for aging damages like shrinking and flattening. More safe is a generally exchange.
Fig. "Aged O-rings" (Lit. 23.4.1-9): Three years after the already about thirty years
old aircraft has been „mothballed“ three
years and the rebuild to a fire extinguishing airplane, it came again into service. Before it underwent an extensive
inspection. Thereby no alarming changes have been determined. Particularly during
the examination of the fuel system about three months before the accident, no fuel
leaks have been observed.
Anyway it was known, that it can come after a three years storage to
„drying-out“ and shrinking of the
O-rings. However the O-rings are `on condition'
parts, these are not life time limited. In this case an exchange applies for
flattened and shrinked O rings (Fig. "O-ring failures and its causes"). The producer of the aeroengine indicated, that a used O
ring must no more incorporated again.
Already at other airplanes of the same type, during military operation
fuel leaks occurred as result of O-ring
failures. However, a fire in connection with a leak
was not observed. Anyway there was a warning of the military operator in case, that
the fuel leak develops near an aeroengine.The hot part of the primary failed
aeroengine is positioned exactly below the nacelle region (dry bay). In it, leakage fuel can
be gathered and flow on the hot aeroengine. The used fuel (Jet-A1) has a relatively
low ignition temperature (flash point, ignition of the fuel vapour with a flame, Ill.
22.2.1-2) of about 40 °C.
These failures have been traced back to bending or thermal expansions of fuel
pipe lines. They occurred more frequently at
screw connections (couplings) as at a
fuel valve.
The leaks had different intensity. Over a longer period of time `bleedings' or
drops developed. The end phase is a sudden failing of the seal with a spray cone.
Fig. "Causes for leaks at O-rings in lines" (Lit. 23.4.1-9): Through thermal expansion differences between pipe lines and its screw connections, markedly movements can occur. Thereby bending and/or axial displacement is possible. Are so the sealing O rings deformed in the screw connections/couplings and/or underlie wear leaks can develop. In such application specific areas especially at the O-ring condition must be payed attention.
Fig. "Influences of O-ring materials" (Lit. 23.4.1-2 and Lit.
23.4.1-4): O-rings can be produced from many
different elastomers (cross column). These materials
can get specifically deteriorated by certain
media (vertical column). Thereby it must be
considered, that besides the material to be sealed,
like aeroengine oil, hydraulic fluid or fuel
further come into consideration. Naturally the
corrosion protection oil must not be critical for a long
time storage. During maintenance and overhaul rather short time contace must be expected.
Here media like rust remover, degreasing,
solvents and lubricants come into question. Also
these must be used only correlating the
specifications. In case of doubt the OEM should be contacted.
Fig. "Identification of O-ring material" (Lit. 23.4.1-2): The
identification of the O ring material, at least a assignment to
larger `families' can be of interest.
For this, the shown sinple device is suitable. It consists of a tube in which a weight drops at the
specimen from a specified height. The height of the
rebound will be assigned the calibrated range.
The following gradiation with decreasing rebound height is material typic:
References
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23.4.1-3 „O-Ring Fluid Compatibility Guide“, www.allorings.com, page 1-5.
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